The result was the Norman invasion, which began with the arrival of Robert FitzStephen, Maurice de Prendergast and their followers in Bannow Bay, Co. Wexford, in May 1169. These forerunners of the English forces of seven centuries consisted of forty knights, sixty other horsemen and some 500 archers. They had chosen what was militarily a good place of entry to Ireland, although they probably did so not so much with that in mind as for the reasons that it lay opposite south Wales, whence they came, and that it was close to Dermot's former seat of power. Eastward of Bannow lay the river Slaney, the valley of which provided a pathway into the interior. Westward lay the estuary of the three great rivers, Suir, Nore and Barrow, the valleys of which offered still greater facilities of penetration into the heart of the country.

Since the Norsemen, the intruders of an earlier age, commanded these two entries from their settlements at Wexford and Water ford, and furthermore held the harbours so necessary for communications with Wales, the first clash of the Norman invaders was with them. Joined by Dermot MacMurrogh, they took Wexford. They then penetrated twice into Ossory-the present Co. Kilkenny-the allegiance of which Dermot claimed, and raided North Leinster. With such assistance Dermot soon re-established himself in his kingdom.

At this stage the High King Rory led a hostile force as far as Ferns, which was the centre of Dermot's power; but Dermot was now willing to temporise and the High King-according to the accepted practice-was satisfied to take hostages for Dermot's good behaviour. There was no fighting. Such compromise was, in the twilight of the existence of their office, typical of the High Kings. It argues a higher regard for negotiation than those who call the Irish a warlike race would perhaps allow. Unfortunately, it also provides an explanation for the failure of the Kings to overcome their 'opposition'.

The more realistic Normans were soon to use more brutal, but more effective, methods than these to gain their ends. FitzStephen was now reinforced by the arrival in Wexford of Maurice, the first of the great FitzGerald family destined later to play so notable a part in Irish history. He brought ten knights, thirty other horsemen and a hundred archers. Accompanied by his powerful auxiliaries, Dermot MacMurrogh again descended in the following year on a Norse settlement over which he claimed suzerainty and which commanded an entry from the sea. He marched to Dublin, overawed the town and secured its submission.

In 1170 also Richard FitzGilbert, known as Strongbow, arrived and the invasion assumed, with a new leader, a new aspect; its motive was no longer assistance of Dermot, but conquest. Strongbow, together with his supporter Raymond le Gros who preceded him, brought 210 knights and over a thousand archers and other footmen. His first action-following the earlier pattern-was the assault and capture of a Norse town, this time Waterford. His second was similar. Leaving a garrison in Waterford, and depending for the moment on the security of Wexford, he marched at once on Dublin, no doubt using one of the southern river valleys for his approach.

It has been pointed out by Orpen, the first of the modern historians of the Norman invasion, that, before this, each of the daimants of the High Kingship had sought, as though his claim required it, the submission of what had for long been the chief town in Ireland. This precedent apart, possession of Dublin was vital for the conquering Normans. It was the chief place of entry from the east to the central plain and indeed, for any power based on England, the gateway to the whole island. As such, possession of it was worth a fight, and Strongbow showed that he was aware of it; besides, unlike the High Kings, to whom towns were prizes to be won but not places to live in, the Normans were willing to possess it.

Haskulf, the Norse King of Dublin, was prepared to resist Strongbow, and the High King, Rory O'Connor, brought up his own forces and those of Breifne (or Leitrim-Cavan), Meath and Oriel (or Monaghan-Armagh) to help the Dublinmen. But Strongbow moved swiftly and cleverly. Descending unexpectedly by a mountain track from Glendalough, he arrived in September 1170 under the walls. Protracted negotiations followed but were rudely interrupted by the Normans, who suddenly assaulted the town and seized it. Haskulf and many of the townsmen fled overseas. Rory and the Irish forces withdrew; the Irish annalists indicate that Rory and his allies believed themselves to have been deserted by the Dublin Norsemen. Dermot, improving on his position, raided the territory of his personal enemy O'rourke. However, Dermot's race was run. He by whom, in the language of the annalists, 'a trembling sod was made of all Ireland', died in Ferns in May following. By the autumn the question of the continued possession of Dublin had been decided and the pattern of the future rule of Ireland had been laid down.

What was the secret of the success of these Normans in the two years that had elapsed since their first coming and how can their still greater success in the battle of Dublin in 1171 be explained?
The victory of the Normans was due to their military ability, and to the fact that they were better equipped than the Irish were; it was also the consequence of the Irish slowness in action and of the Irish political circumstances, which made effective opposition to the intruders almost impossible. But primarily it was a matter of military superiority.

The Normans were the descendants of a warlike race that, in the century of transition from Vikings to feudal rulers in northern France and the further century of conquest and struggle in England and Wales, had grown increasingly formidable. In France they became horsemen. In the eleventh century the age of the cavalry soldier had begun; the Normans entered into the spirit and adopted the practice of the age. When they crossed to Ireland they brought their horses with them, as their ancestors had brought horses across the Channel to fight the battle of Hastings. In battle their best men fought mounted and wore byrnies or hauberks of mail-long skirted coats of iron rings, or of quilted fabric, or leather reinforced with metal studs. They had hoods or coifs of mail, over which they wore conical iron hdmets; some wore leggings or chausses of mail. Their shields were kite-shaped, a form adapted for mounted use and giving complete cover to the left side of a rider. Their weapons were a lance, a long, straight bladed sword, and sometimes a club or mace. Such arms, such armour, the heavy horses which they rode and the skill and daring of the riders gave the Normans great power as shock troops. The Irish had no such warriors as these Norman knights. Like the Spanish horsemen in Mexico, the knights dominated the battlefield.

Nor were these the Normans' only fighters. They had also good archers, skilled bowmen from the Welsh marches, the forerunners of the famous longbowmen of England who, two centuries later, won the battles of Crécy and Agincourt. The Normans were archers before their arrival in England, and they had improved their archery by contact with the native bowmen of Wales. In Ireland, their archers gave them a fire-power which their opponents lacked. The Irish made little use of the bow in battle.

These two qualities, the weight of mailed horsemen in a charge and the missile strength of bowmen, formed the basis of the Norman tactics. They sought consistently to exploit their advantage of materiaL Always they attacked, always they sought to fight in the open, where they could use their horses; to be outnumbered meant nothing to them. When the Waterfordmen closed in on Raymond le Gros in 1170 he sallied out to meet them; de Courcy came out to meet MacDonlevy at Down in 1177; Strongbow and de Cogan, as we shall see, came out to meet the Norsemen and the Irish at Dublin. Each of these was heavily outnumbered, but each was victorious.

The Normans were swift in their movements, as they showed at Bannow Bay, at Wexford, at Dublin, and in Down. They were able to attack fortifications-and here their archery served them but they avoided fighting behind walls. They had an eye for strategy, and so they made certain of possession of the towns They had an eye for terrain: they were cautious on the forest paths, they avoided the bogs, and, in 1170, they chose the best way into Dublin behind the High King's back. They were infinitely crafty. They feigned retreats, they planted ambushes they delivered flank attacks, they attacked at night.

In contrast, the Irish were poorly equipped, dilatory, and too prone to the defensive. A few of their leaders may have had armour, but in general they had none. In general too they were infantry. They fought on foot with spears, javelins, battle axes and swords; the only item of their missile armoury that their opponents found worthy of mention was the antediluvian hand stone. The attack of mailed horse could, on firm ground, overrun them and against a combination of horse and archers-of shock and fire-power-they were helpless. They behaved always as though they had plenty of time. When Strongbow seized Dublin in 1170 the High King went home: he would come back next year. Fortifications, then as for centuries afterwards, daunted them.

At the date of the Dublin fighting there were not, it appears, more than 2,500 Normans in Ireland, that is, perhaps 250 knights, 500 other horsemen, and 1,750 infantry, including archers. Some of these had remained to hold Wexford and Waterford, so that the Norman strength at Dublin cannot in the early part of the year have greatly exceeded 2,000, or perhaps 200 knights, 400 other horsemen, and 1,500 or so archers and other infantry.

The knights were not the chivalric figures of romantic fiction and of later admiration who 'swung their swords in wrong cause or in right'. They were fighting men whose service was the result of a system of landholding, the feudal system. Land was given in that age by kings and great lords to lesser lords, who held it on condition of providing knights, or fully armed, trained and mounted men, for service in the wars. These were the knights of the invasion: tough professionals, well equipped and, above all, well horsed. Such heavily armed horsemen were the tanks of the occasion; like the tanks of 1940, they were irresistible when they attacked on ground that suited them an enemy deficient in striking power. They were the elite troops. The other mounted men were less heavily armed and of a poorer quality. The foot induded spearmen and men fighting with sword and shield, but were mostly archers, whose role was second in importance only to that of the knights. Unsupported by archers, horsemen could not face archers. Although the Irish made no great use of the bow in battle, and so gave the knights an easy victory over them, the Norman-Welsh archers nevertheless played a vital part in Strongbow's struggle against numerical odds.

part 3

From Irish Battles - A Military History of Ireland by G.A.Hayes-McCoy. Click here for more information on the book.

Further reading: A Little History of Ireland by Martin Wallace with illustrations by Ian McCullough. Click here for more information on the book.