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The Boyne, 1690
The Boyne was fordable in many places in 1690; still, William's progress might be contested on its banks. The Jacobite army which occupied the south bank with its centre at Oldbridge, Co. Meath, its right at Drogheda and its left towards Slane was in position to make the attempt. It would have been impossible for William, if the Jacobites were to stand, and he was to retain anything of his reputation, to avoid a battle. Unfortunately, the Jacobite position, although it was the only one that could have been taken up on the river, had two serious defects. The river Boyne, on its eastward course towards the Irish Sea, bends to the north below Rosnaree, flows for over three miles in a northerly direction and then turns east again at Oldbridge. It thus forms a large loop around the ridge of high ground which extends from the south-west to the north-east through Donore. James, who was concentrated in the Donore-Oldbridge area so as to cover the fords at Oldbridge, was within the loop. In other words, when William arrived opposite James across the stream from Oldbridge he found that the bend of the river indented his bank. More than a hundred years later the great military theorist of the nineteenth century, the high priest of the Napoleonic legend, Baron Antoine Henri J omini, was to remind his many readers that it is well when attempting to force the passage of a river 'to choose a place where the river forms a re-entrant bend or elbow', since such a position permits the attacker to secure a bridgehead by enfilade fire. General Sir Edward Bruce Hamley, the author of Operations of War, was to echo J omini's words; Hamley says that, in such circumstances, an attacking force can by disposing itself around the bend, 'command and enclose the angle of the other bank'. Later still, General Sir Francis Clery was to place it on record in his celebrated book on tactics that 'this configuration of ground is carefully sought for'. This knowledge did not prevent Clery, when he fought in South Mrica, from ordering an advance which sent Hildyard's brigade and the Irish Brigade of the time into two loops of the Tugela river at Colenso in 1899, where the Boers, commanding and enclosing the angles-although, unlike the forces of the textbooks, they were the defenders rather than the attackers-completely defeated them. James's position at the Boyne suffered from the same defect as Buller's position at the Tugela. The bend of the river enclosed him to his disadvantage and if William got across behind him at Rosnaree or at Slane his left would be endangered. The second weakness of terrain as far as James was concerned lay in the fact that an enemy force on the south bank at Rosnaree would be nearer to Duleek than he was at Donore. The only practicable crossing in 1690 of the Nanny, which runs parallel with the Boyne three miles to the south, was at Duleek; over it lay James's line of retreat towards Dublin. If James's enemies could block the passage at Duleek he would be in serious difficulties. In fact, if William could take advantage of his position on the indented bank, and of his superior numbers, to cross behind his opponent and to stop up his line of retreat-meanwhile holding him within the loop-he could annihilate him. The defects of the Boyne as a line of defence were as great as that. James's security depended on his guarding his left.
The history of the Battle of the Boyne, 1690 continues here
Taken from Irish Battles by G.A. Hayes-McCoy, published by Appletree Press.
Further reading: A Little History of Ireland by Martin Wallace with illustrations by Ian McCullough. Click here for more information on the book.
Previous instalments of 'the Battle of the Boyne':
Part 1 |
Part 2 |
Part 3 |
Part 4 |
Part 5 |
Part 6 |
Part 7 |
Further instalments of 'the Battle of the Boyne':
Part 9 |
Part 10 |
Part 11 |
Part 12 |
Part 13 |
Part 14
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