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The Boyne, 1690
Count Solms, the leader of the Dutch, who was later to succeed William as commander-in-chief in Ireland, disagreed with Schomberg. He favoured a single attack of the whole Williamite army at Oldbridge. These two, Schomberg and Solms, ranked above the others, and William, who decided the matter, seems to have combined their recommendations. It was resolved to make both frontal and flank attacks, but more troops than Schomberg had proposed were to be retained at Oldbridge; in the end, two-thirds of the army fought there and only a third made the flank attack, and this detachment was sent off so late that the Jacobites were given plenty of time to make arrangements to meet it. The detachment did not begin to march until five o'clock, or perhaps a little before that, on the morning of I July, the day of the battle. It consisted of the cavalry of William's right wing, two regiments of dragoons and ten battalions of infantry (Trelawney's brigade), or in all about 10,000 men. These troops did not all march together. Schomberg's son, Count Meinhard Schomberg, first led some of the cavalry, some infantry and the dragoons towards Rosnaree; he was followed to that ford or to some of the other fords between Rosnaree and Slane by Lieut.-General James Douglas, who led the remainder of the infantry and a brigade of cavalry. Some of these troops may have gone as far as Slane, but this seems unlikely; it would appear rather that they all crossed downstream from Slane. Douglas, who from his seniority must eventually have commanded the whole detachment, does not seem to have marched until the younger Schomberg was across. The Jacobite troops, who were by that time marching themselves to intercept the right wing of their enemies, saw the Williamites 'marching off from their right . . . the river being between both for a considerable space.' Young Schomberg reached the Boyne about six o'clock, or perhaps half an hour later. He saw on the other side a party of mounted men of Sir Neill O'Neill's dragoon regiment, to which King James had entrusted the defence of the Slane-Rosnaree crossings, and which formed in the early stages of the action the Jacobite left wing. Schomberg sent some mounted grenadiers and Dutch dragoons-the special service troops of that time, successors of the' commanded men' of fifty years before and forerunners of the pickets of fifty years after-down to the ford. O'Neill's men opened fire, but Schomberg's got across. O'Neill had orders 'to defend that pass as long as he could, without exposing his men to be cut to pieces'. It is to be presumed that he did so. He himself was mortally wounded; five or six men were killed and others hurt, but the Jacobiteswereheavilyoutnumbered and were forced back. James and his advisers had by this time realised that their left was threatened and had begun to detach troops in that direction. The retiring dragoons were soon supported, but it was too late to block the fords. Douglas and the young Schomberg passed all of their 10,000 men across as the morning advanced. The Jacobite deficiency on the left was limited to their failure to deny the passage of the river to their opponents. O'Neill had done his best, but, although the terrain favoured him-the ground rises steeply from the south bank at Rosnaree-he was not strong enough for his task. Very soon the left wing suffered no such lack of strength. Two regiments of Jacobite cavalry, one of which was Sarsfield's, came over towards Rosnaree. With them came Lauzun and the whole French force, six battalions of the best infantry that James had. These troops were followed by more Irish infantry, until in the end almost half James's army was on his left; that it was the stronger half was perhaps shown by the fact that James himself joined it. This disposition proved quite effective to counter Douglas's threat. Douglas had moved a little way downstream from the fords, but he was held up where the Boyne bends towards the north and the ground begins to rise towards the Donore ridge. Here, with their right on the river and their backs to Donore and Duleek, probably between Corballis and Roughgrange, stood the French and Irish, blocking his further progress. Douglas drew up facing them, well beyond musket range, and the Irish extended to their left to cover his line. A stream flowed towards the river through boggy ground between the two forces. Two deep and high-banked ditches also ran between them, making cavalry service impossible and a passage on foot difficult. In this place James's left wing and William's right remained facing one another throughout the morning without becoming engaged. The Jacobites had made up for their earlier neglect and had prevented William from turning them. They had secured their line of retreat and had saved themselves from the possibility of disaster. It was, however, unfortunate, in view of what was so soor to happen there, that they had to strip so many men from their centre to do so.
The history of the Battle of the Boyne, 1690 continues here
Taken from Irish Battles by G.A. Hayes-McCoy, published by Appletree Press.
Further reading: A Little History of Ireland by Martin Wallace with illustrations by Ian McCullough. Click here for more information on the book.
Previous instalments of 'the Battle of the Boyne':
Part 1 |
Part 2 |
Part 3 |
Part 4 |
Part 5 |
Part 6 |
Part 7 |
Part 8 |
Part 9
Further instalments of 'the Battle of the Boyne':
Part 11 |
Part 12 |
Part 13 |
Part 14
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